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THE OCCULT DOES NOT EXIST: A RESPONSE
TO TERENCE RANGER
Gerrie ter Haar and Stephen Ellis
In 2007, Africa published a review article by Terence Ranger (2007)
concerning ‘medicine murders’, ‘child witches’ and the construction
of ‘the occult’. Ranger frames his review with remarks concerning a
murder inquiry by London’s Metropolitan Police that was set up after
the discovery in the River Thames of the dismembered corpse of a
young boy of probable West African origin, whom the police dubbed
‘Adam’.
Briefly, Ranger admonishes the British police for making use of a
crude stereotype of Africa in their inquiry. He goes on to present
his own views by way of a critique of a number of recent works
on religion in Africa. Ranger does not explain what he means by
‘the occult’, but it is clearly the category to which he consigns such
anti-social and violent or vicious practices as ‘medicine murders’ and
‘witchcraft’. Ranger distinguishes between ‘religion’ and ‘the occult’
without explicitly stating what the difference between them is, although
in another publication (Ranger 2006: 351) he concedes that it is
‘very important, though extraordinarily difficult’ to distinguish between
religion and certain closely related elements, among which he names
‘magic’ and ‘witchcraft’.
The present article challenges Ranger’s argument concerning ‘the
occult’ on the grounds that ‘the occult’ is one of many concepts and
expressions used in Western academic writing that carries a heavy
ideological baggage. Other common expressions falling in this category
include ‘magic’ and ‘witchcraft’, both of which are indelibly marked by
their colonial usage.1 Continued use of these terms is flawed by their
association with a long tradition of thinking of Africa as a continent
stuck in a traditional past, to be understood only in terms different from
those applied to the rest of humanity today. The choice of language
by academics is a matter of great importance. As Harold Turner long
ago noted in regard to African-initiated churches, ‘our approach to any
range of phenomena is both revealed and influenced by the names we
bestow upon it’ (1976: 13). Our point is not to argue that ‘magic’,
‘witchcraft’ or ‘the occult’ do not deserve to be debated, but that they
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1Until the 1970s, concepts such as ‘magic’ and ‘primitive religion’ were generally seen by
scholars as unproblematic and of universal application within an evolutionary framework. In
a classic work on British history, for example, Keith Thomas (1973: 52) specifically compares
early modern England to Africa. For a discussion on the applicability of the term ‘witchcraft’
today, see the introductory chapter in ter Haar (2007).
400 THE OCCULT DOES NOT EXIST
cannot be understood in their proper historical and moral context as
long as the debate is couched in a language that is so heavily loaded.
Religious phenomena – even those that one may personally find
repugnant – are best described in neutral terms. This implies that, if
scholars are to break with the tradition of regarding Africa as an
exceptional continent, they need to describe practices and ideas by
applying categories that can also be used, at least in principle, in regard
to any other human society. If we take this as a point of departure, it is
apparent that many of the phenomena that Terence Ranger considers to
fall into the category of ‘the occult’ are better placed within the purview
of religion more generally. This, of course, depends on how one defines
religion – something that Ranger neglects to do, just as he does not
define any of the other key concepts he uses. It is not a matter of
choosing a favourite definition of religion from among the many dozens
on offer. What is required is to formulate a definition that emerges
from the context under study. Elsewhere we have proposed a working
definition of religion in Africa as ‘a belief in the existence of an invisible
world, distinct but not separate from the visible one, that is home to
spiritual beings with effective powers over the material world’ (Ellis
and ter Haar 2004: 14). This is a working definition, elaborated with a
view to incorporating the entire range of religious practices and ideas in
Africa. In passing, we may note that it applies to many other parts of the
world, too. It is deliberately couched in terms that are morally neutral
and value-free. It allows for the inclusion of a broad range of mystical
beliefs and practices, irrespective of whether observers consider them to
be positive or negative. The latter is precisely what Ranger (2007: 276)
objects to in our approach. However, spiritual power, a concept that is
crucial to understanding religion in Africa, can be employed for both
socially constructive and destructive purposes. This is a capital point,
but one that Ranger avoids, apparently on account of his own moral
position.
Connections between religion and morality are historically formed;
they are not the same in all societies. As we discuss below, a specific
connection was developed in early Christianity that still colours the
views of many authors today. In this regard, Terence Ranger appears
to be one of the many writers who have come to think of religion as
something that is (or at least should be) concerned with whatever is
good and life-affirming. Adopting such a view leaves no room for ideas
and practices relating to a perceived invisible world that are destructive
or anti-social. These are precisely the sorts of beliefs and practices that
Ranger does not consider to be part of religion, but that he instead
consigns to a separate category of ‘the occult’.
Hence, Ranger’s review article raises important theoretical problems
that we propose to address. We begin this task by examining the
genealogy of some key ideas concerning the concept of religion.
This, we believe, takes us closer to constructing a suitable theoretical
framework for discussing such matters as Terence Ranger places within
the category of ‘the occult’. This is a term widely used by evangelicals
in the USA to designate ‘bad’ religion (Jenkins and Maier-Katkin
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1992: 62) that has been popularized by Jean and John Comaroff (1999)
as a quasi-technical term, notably in regard to Africa. Although Ranger
tells us (2006: 360) that he dislikes the term ‘occult’, he continues to
use it to designate beliefs and practices that are socially destructive.
‘GOOD’ AND ‘BAD’ RELIGION
So deep has been the historical effect of European practices of labelling
and categorization that even the terms ‘religious’ and ‘religion’ require
some elucidation. For these words, too, carry a historical burden,
having been introduced by Europeans in reference to a wide range
of practices that they encountered in other parts of the world in early
modern times. A major problem arises from the way in which, over a
long period, Europeans imposed on other societies, or at least attributed
to them, ideas that derived from Europe’s own particular history. There
exists a substantial corpus of literature, produced notably by academic
specialists in the study of religion, that investigates the long historical
pedigree of the term ‘religion’ as it is presently used. This literature
reveals the relationship between political power, intellectual authority
and social practice in the formation of new, globalized, ideas of religion
in recent centuries (for example, Asad 1993; Masuzawa 2005).
European writers in mediaeval and early modern times considered
that there were four types of religious observer: Christians, Jews,
Mohammedans (as Muslims were then known as), and ‘the rest’,
meaning all others deemed to be attached to some form of idolatry
(Masuzawa 2007: 181). This characteristic, fourfold division of
religions persisted into the early nineteenth century. By that time, it
had become apparent to European intellectuals that a more complex
classification was necessary, not least in order to accommodate the
sophisticated beliefs enshrined in Buddhism, which possessed all the
hallmarks of what a European intellectual of those days could regard
as a ‘real’ religion as opposed to a mere superstition. Indigenous
African religious practices, meanwhile, remained consigned to a
residual category that included – to use the vocabulary of the nineteenth
century – polytheists, animists and idolators.
In sub-Saharan Africa, the introduction of a new vocabulary
regarding the invisible world was part of a far more general imposition
of new administrative arrangements and practices of power of Western
origin or inspiration. Among the novelties of the age of colonialism was
the identification of religion and politics as two distinct realms, which
should properly be subject to institutional and intellectual separation.
This new vocabulary and conceptual order gave a new meaning
to ideas and practices in African societies concerning the invisible
world, cutting across existing categories and thereby distorting the
empirical reality of indigenous religious experience as well as its various
expressions. It is for this reason that many African scholars in the
field of religion have reacted against the vocabulary and some of the
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conceptual categories that were introduced in the nineteenth century.
As David Westerlund (1985: 87–8) has noted:
In the works of African scholars there is often sharp criticism of Western
terms designating different aspects of African religion. Many of these terms
are considered to be inadequate and derogatory. For instance, words like
‘animism’ and ‘fetishism’ are considered inappropriate as general labels of
African religion, and it is stressed that they have been used by Western
scholars in order to ridicule this religion.
In the light of the above remarks, the concept of ‘the occult’ may
be seen to be a recent addition to the stock of labels designating those
aspects of African religion that observers find bizarre, distasteful, or, in
any event, that they do not consider to be part of any ‘true’ religion.
The identification of ideas and practices deemed worthy to be
included in the category of ‘religion’, as opposed to those of a
supposedly lesser order disqualified for inclusion in this same category,
has a long history. The distinction between ‘religion’ and less worthy
forms of practice, often glossed as ‘superstition’, may be traced
back through early modern times to the classical Roman tradition of
distinguishing religio and superstitio (Pagden 1986: 168–9). Awareness
of how these terms have evolved throws considerable light on the
European penchant for distinguishing ‘true’ from ‘false’ religion, or
‘good’ from ‘bad’ religion.
For the ancient Romans, religio was an organized and controlled
activity of the patrician class. Superstitio, by contrast, was the religious
practice of the lower orders of Roman society, associated with perceived
social and intellectual disorder (Momigliano 1977: 141–59). In regard
to the twin concepts of religio and superstitio, Italo Ronca (1992: 43)
has observed that ‘neither the terms themselves nor their negative
correlation are cross-cultural universals to be reckoned with in all
cultures or at all times: in many areas not influenced by Christianity
there is no equivalent to such conceptual terminology’. Modern
connotations of ‘religion’ and ‘superstition’, as well as their semantic
polarity, he argues (1992: 44), are the result of a long theistic tradition.
The meaning of these terms is historically conditioned, as are their
correlative semantic fields.
The identification by European thinkers and administrators of
certain practices as being either religious or superstitious in nature has
had a formative effect not only on Africa but on societies in many parts
of the world. Some of the effects of these processes of categorization
have been well described by the Korean scholar Chin Hong Chung
(2007). He notes that before the late nineteenth century the Korean
language had no equivalent to the word ‘religion’. It was an alien term
that entered Korea as part of a more general process of modernization,
in this case transmitted via Japan. According to Chung (2007: 206):
[t]he concept of religion never succeeded in incorporating our experience
fully, and it has been utilized as an inappropriate measure and criterion
in the description and understanding of our traditional belief culture.
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It is unavoidable, therefore, to reach the point where the empirical reality
of traditional religious experience and its expression is distorted, devalued,
and confused by such a newly enforced word as ‘religion’.
In Africa, a similar process took place to the one outlined by Chung
in regard to Korea. In Africa too, many or probably most languages
appear to have had no ready translation for the word ‘religion’
prior to evangelization by Christian missionaries, and no equivalent
experience.
WRITING ON RELIGION IN AFRICA
J. D. Y. Peel has noted (2000: 88–122) in regard to the Yoruba that
a wide range of what would now be regarded as indigenous religious
practices were originally subsumed in an expression used by West
African speakers of English in the nineteenth century, ‘making country
fashion’. How indigenous practices in relation to an invisible world
have subsequently been construed by writers, clerics, politicians and
officials as either ‘religion’ or ‘superstition’, or how they have been
labelled by some other name, is a process that has had a great bearing
on local perceptions of spiritual power and on the moral value attached
to attempts to access such power. In order to illustrate this more fully,
a brief summary is helpful.
Generally speaking, one may identify two phases in the history of
the study of religion in Africa (Platvoet 1996). The first of these
can be described as ‘Africa as object’, referring to an early period
in which religious data were studied by scholars from outside Africa,
many of them amateur ethnographers. This cohort of early foreign
collectors, antiquaries and observers established many of the basic
approaches, methods, concepts and labels used subsequently. A second
phase is that of ‘Africa as subject’, when similar data were also being
studied by professionally trained specialists, including African scholars,
most recently based in African universities. Accompanying this change
of phase from Africa-as-object to Africa-as-subject was a change in
the moral value that observers ascribed to religion in Africa. In the
high Victorian period, missionaries and colonizers generally considered
indigenous African religious practices to be pretty much uniformly
contemptible because they did not constitute ‘true’ religion, with a
partial exception being made only for Islam. Early Christian evangelists
often considered indigenous religious practices as ‘a kind of absence’,
as Peel (2000: 12) has noted in regard to Nigeria. In other words, they
were not perceived to have any real substance.
In general, it was only after the institution of colonial rule that
opinions like these tended to change somewhat. Some colonial officials,
spending long periods in Africa, came to see the complexity and
subtlety of African religious ideas. If only for administrative purposes,
they had to learn to understand the relationship of indigenous religion
to justice, land tenure and other matters affecting the social and political
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order. The colonial period also witnessed the arrival of professional
anthropologists in Africa, who tended to view African religious ideas
and practices in functional terms, as the cultural epiphenomena
associated with specific social and political complexes bearing an ethnic
label. Thus was the concept of ethnic religions formed, with a plethora
of books on Zulu religion, Yoruba religion, and many others. This
was of a piece with the view characteristic of European administrators
and scholars until quite late in the colonial period that Africa was
best understood as being divided into thousands of discrete ethnic
communities, each having its own culture and its own religion. There
also emerged texts from African intellectuals trained in European
methods, who were able to describe in the academic vocabulary of their
day the religious and cultural systems that they knew from within (for
example, Kenyatta 1938).
By the time African countries gained political independence, from
the late 1950s onwards, the colonial administrations that were then
disappearing, and the expatriate colonial society associated with them,
included quite a few individuals who had come to appreciate the
subtlety and social usefulness of African religious thought. They found
common cause with African intellectuals who were, by this time, able to
express their ideas in print more easily than before. African theologians
of the generation of Bolaji Idowu (1962) and John Mbiti (1969) turned
colonial values on their heads, much as nationalist ideologues were also
doing, by claiming that certain elements of Africa’s cultures previously
condemned by Europeans as negative should in fact be considered
positively. Many writers in this genre, European or African, were
themselves practising Christians or, at least, had undergone a church
or missionary education that had impressed on them the basic tenets of
Christian religion.
African theologians in particular in the mid- to late twentieth century
articulated what may be called a ‘theology of continuity’ (Westerlund
1985: 89). This refers to a process of interpreting African religious ideas
and practices in the light of Christianity, in such a way as to identify
elements of African indigenous religions that appear to resemble or
anticipate aspects of Christian belief. Typical of this enterprise was
the construction of African Traditional Religion – in the singular, and
with capital letters – as a system of belief comparable to other major
religions. One result of this change of perspective was to suggest that
the African sub-continent is not divided into autonomous areas, each
with its own distinctive religion corresponding to an ethnic identity,
as earlier generations of Europeans had often supposed. Instead,
commentators now tended to discern some of the similarities between
religious ideas and practices over wide tracts of Africa, for example in
regard to healing, noting that certain cults may mobilize people over
very wide areas, creating a religious geography that transcends political
boundaries (Ranger 1991).
The nationalist discourse of the mid-twentieth century, in both
political and theological forms, aimed at restoring the dignity of African
culture (quite often in the singular rather than the plural) after the
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indignities and misrepresentations heaped on it by European scholars
and colonialists. Terence Ranger has been a distinguished contributor
to this work of rehabilitation in both religious and political fields,
being a pioneer in the re-evaluation and reinterpretation of African
religious ideas and practices (for example, Ranger and Kimambo 1972)
and a leading historian of African nationalism (Ranger 1967). For
more than four decades, Ranger has remained faithful to a vision
of religion in Africa as essentially a search for harmony, a point he
expresses in his review article (Ranger 2007: 276) when he refers
to the importance of individual and collective healing, rain making,
peacemaking and environmental protection as key elements of African
religions.
These are indeed distinctive elements of African religious practices.
They fit easily into a view of African religions that represents
religion as fundamentally a search for what is ‘good’ and positive,
reflecting current translations of key Christian ideas. However, such
a framework of analysis, rooted in Christian theology, pays little
heed to religious ideas that underlie practices less appealing to a
liberal sensibility. It leaves no conceptual room for religious practices
that are not easily assimilated into a view of religion as a personal
and social good. It makes no allowance for inclusion of beliefs
and practices that are not concerned with such demonstrably useful
or socially constructive matters as healing and reconciliation. It
reflects a perspective that descends in an unbroken genealogical line
from the early modern categorization of the world that we have
summarized above, distinguishing ‘true’ or ‘good’ religion from ‘false’
or ‘bad’ religion or superstition. A similar approach is replicated in
anthropological views of religion in Africa inasmuch as these have
tended to consider religion primarily in terms of social practices and
institutions, to be judged by its social utility. This has diverted attention
from the intellectual dimension of religion in Africa.
In other words, there exists a tradition in social science of considering
religion in Africa as primarily something that binds people together,
a means of social cohesion.2 At this point we find ourselves once
more drawn back to a very old debate at the heart of Christianity,
namely that concerning the original meaning of ‘religion’. It is often
suggested that the English word ‘religion’ derives ultimately from the
Latin religare,meaning ‘to re-bind’. However, no less an expert than the
pre-Christian orator Cicero was clear in stating that religio was derived
from relegere/religere, meaning ‘to re-trace, to re-collect’, referring to
the practice of divination as one of the three pillars – together with
prayer and sacrifice – of Roman religion. It was later Christian authors,
notably Augustine of Hippo (354–430), one of the founding fathers of
the Church, who were intent on regarding religio as that which binds
man to God by means of love, insisting on deriving the word from
2In the social sciences, the most influential proponent of the idea that religion is something
that binds people is Durkheim (1912).
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religare (Ronca 1992: 52–3). This marked a decisive shift from the
classical Roman view of religion as a human response to a continuous
stream of revelatory messages from an invisible world (as it was seen by
Cicero and other pre-Christian authors) to a Christian articulation of
religion in terms of a bond between man and God. From a Christian
perspective, the nature of the latter relationship was held to have
been fully revealed through the person of Jesus, which made further
revelation unnecessary, such as through divination.
The interest of this brief reference to debates in early Christianity is
the insight it provides concerning the historical transformations in the
concept of religion in European history. Here, some of the problems
in applying the term ‘religion’ to Africa become apparent. Since the
expansion of Europe in early modern times, Europeans have imposed
a Christian interpretation of the concept ‘religion’ on other parts of
the world, ignoring the deeper history of ‘religion’ in those places,
and even in the ancient history of Europe itself. The emergence of a
secular social science has made little difference in this regard, as social
scientists have, apparently unknowingly in many cases, continued an
old Christian apologetic by supposing that the true meaning of religion
lies in its binding force.
We see here that nothing much has changed since colonial times
other than the normative value attached to specific African practices.
What is constant is the insistence that good and bad do not belong
together in ‘true’ religion.
THE PROBLEM OF ‘THE OCCULT’
The working definition of religion that we have provided is placed
in a broad theory of religion and politics (Ellis and ter Haar 2004)
that corresponds to paradigms concerning the relationship between
the visible and invisible worlds that are widespread among Africans.
Political power is widely perceived as originating in the invisible
world. This is one reason why many African politicians devote serious
attention to the spirit world. As Max Weber (1946: 123) observed
in one of his most celebrated essays, ‘he who lets himself in for
politics, that is, for power and force as means, contracts with diabolical
powers’. This resonates in Africa, where religious activity is most
persuasively understood as a search for spiritual power rather than
in terms of an Augustinian theology. It is important to note in this
regard that in African histories, ideas about the power of good and
evil have typically been contained within a single mental framework.
Many Africans regard power as morally ambiguous, and appear to
have done so for centuries. This means that healers are also seen as
potential killers due to the morally ambiguous nature of the spiritual
powers that they are deemed to possess. The mystical powers attributed
to them are not thought of as literally supernatural, but as natural
forces.
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What Terence Ranger and others call ‘the occult’ is therefore best
understood in terms of mystical power. The central element in the
identification of certain practices as ‘occult’ seems actually to be the
experience of evil (cf. Ranger 2006: 355). However, the experience of
evil is not limited to certain societies only. The main problem with using
‘the occult’ as a separate category is thus that it deprives analysts of
sophisticated tools for thinking about culturally embedded notions of
evil. Practices of the type labelled by Ranger as ‘occult’ do exist. The
problem is how to understand them.
Social scientists tend to respond in one of three ways to reports of
‘occult’ events in Africa, such as violence motivated by witchcraft beliefs
or killings carried out to obtain body parts. A frequent reaction is simply
to avert one’s gaze, considering such occurrences as aberrations that it
would be distasteful or unjustifiable to include in any mainstream social
analysis, or to question whether such things really happen. Terence
Ranger seems to come close to this position, implying that the British
police were wrong even to consider that the killing of the boy Adam,
whose corpse they found in the River Thames in September 2001,
might conceivably have been perpetrated in an attempt to acquire
spiritual power. A second response is to interpret such matters as
explicable in terms of specific cultures, an approach that few academics
are likely to adopt nowadays. A third point of view, much in vogue
in recent anthropology, is to regard such behaviour as expressions of
economic forces, construed as so-called ‘occult economies’. This last
point of view is criticized quite effectively by Terence Ranger in his
review article (2007). However, none of these three ways of reacting
to ‘occult’ events is satisfactory, or at least not without considerable
clarification and nuance.
We do not know, for lack of evidence, why the boy Adam was
killed. Whether he was killed by someone in search of spiritual power
is unknown. What is clear, though, is that killing in order to obtain
spiritual power does take place. Where there is evidence that such an
event has occurred, in our view any analysis has to begin by considering
what the perpetrators might have had in mind. This is because ‘[t]he
insider’s perception of reality is instrumental to understanding and
accurately describing situations and behaviours’ (Fetterman 1989: 30).
Hence, the pursuit of spiritual power falls within the category of
religion, as suggested by our working definition. This is an operational
definition that proceeds by ‘taking African epistemologies seriously’
(Ellis and ter Haar 2007), in other words by taking African modes of
thought as a point of departure. Socially positive and socially harmful
practices both exist within the field of religion. Referring to a specific
act or practice as ‘religious’ does not imply any definite moral value
since, academically speaking, religion itself is neither good nor bad, but
morally ambiguous. Placing so-called ‘occult’ practices within a broader
religious field helps us to understand the full range of their moral, social
and political meanings.
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CONCLUSION
The review article by Terence Ranger published in Africa is not
centrally concerned with Scotland Yard’s investigation of the supposed
murder of the boy known to the British police as Adam. Really,
what Ranger does is to use the story of the murder inquiry as a
literary device, a peg on which to hang his discussion of the academic
literature on ‘the occult’ in regard to Africa. He proposes his own
method for investigating ‘the occult’, emphasizing the importance of
context, the crucial need to disaggregate data, and the significance of
history (Ranger 2007: 282). Putting things into context and sifting data
carefully, however, no matter how skilfully done, will not get us much
closer to the goal of understanding if this process is itself based on
categories that are unsound. This, we have argued, is the case with
the concept of ‘the occult’.
Perhaps Ranger believes that the killing of people for ritual purposes,
such as to obtain body parts, does not actually occur, or only very
rarely. Yet there is overwhelming evidence that such practices do
occur and have important social and political consequences. In Nigeria,
according to official estimates, there were as many as 6,000 so-called
‘ritual murders’ between 1992 and 1996, although this figure does not
seem to be the result of careful gathering of statistics (Harnischfeger
2006: 61). Archbishop Peter Akinola (2007), leader of Nigeria’s 20
million practising Anglicans, has described how he himself came close
to being killed in his youth by an uncle who ‘was going to sacrifice
me for a ritual to make money’. Akinola attributes his own religious
vocation to the trauma of this experience. In the trial currently taking
place in The Hague of Charles Taylor, the former President of Liberia
has been alleged by former associates to have headed a group that
regularly carried out such activities for the purpose of acquiring spiritual
power (Marzah 2008: 6087–159). Comi Toulabor (2000) has written
a brave essay on killings carried out by politicians in West Africa in
pursuit of spiritual power. Regarding body parts, in the late 1980s
and early 1990s, the township of Umlazi in Durban, South Africa,
experienced a ‘muti murder’ about once a fortnight, and some nearby
settlements as many as six times per month (Evans 1992: 51). This
suggests that the number of such killings in KwaZulu-Natal alone ran
into dozens per year. In Tanzania, in April 2008 President Jakaya
Kikwete publicly condemned the killing of albinos for body parts;
nineteen killings had reportedly taken place in the previous year (BBC
2008). As for witchcraft accusations, the large number of these in some
countries is well attested, for example in South Africa, where hundreds
of people have been killed on these grounds (Ralushai Commission
1996), as well as in other parts of Africa (ter Haar 2007). In some
African diaspora communities also, there have been accounts of serious
crimes being committed for reasons connected to a belief in spiritual
power. These have led for example to prosecutions of people accused
of assault in regard to beatings they have inflicted on children suspected
of witchcraft (Dodd 2005).
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It may be noted that we have drawn examples from southern, eastern
and West Africa here, as well as from outside the continent. One of
the objections that Ranger has made in regard to the methods of the
British police is precisely that they have lumped data from different
parts of Africa, failing to disaggregate and specify. We emphasize that
our purpose is not to suggest that there is ‘an aggregated African occult’
(Ranger 2007: 277) in the sense that acts shown to have occurred
in one place are therefore liable to take place throughout the sub-
continent. Our point is to suggest that such practices do actually occur
with some frequency in separate parts of Africa and that they are in
fact religious actions in the sense that they emanate from the belief
in an invisible world inhabited by spiritual forces deemed to have
effective powers over the material world. They reflect religious ideas
that are quite widespread in Africa, although of course with regional
variations. The authors of probably the most detailed historical study
of so-called medicine murders, in regard to colonial Lesotho, have no
doubt that ‘medicine murder was, and is, a hideous reality’ (Murray
and Sanders 2005: 290). Moreover, they explicitly suggest a framework
for comparison with other countries within the southern African region
and also find the idea of a comparison with West Africa to be admissible
(ibid.: 299–310, 443, note 3).
We should be clear about the point of listing these examples
of religious practices associated with criminal acts. The widespread
acceptance by Africanist scholars of ‘the occult’ as an analytical
category appears to have caused some of them to dismiss from the
outset reports of crimes allegedly carried out in pursuit of spiritual
power. Consequently, they may feel little need to examine empirical
data at all. Thus Ranger has made no effort to investigate the
death of the boy Adam beyond commenting on reports of the police
investigation. He has not carried out significant research into the actual
occurrence or non-occurrence of the practices alleged. Furthermore,
some academics (for example van Dijk 2001), equipped with theories
of questionable value concerning ‘occult’ economies, disqualify other
sectors of society altogether as legitimate interpreters of reality. Those
dismissed in this way include not only European police forces but also,
most importantly, African communities both in Africa and in Europe.
Yet these so-called ‘occult’ practices are also forms of serious crime, in
some cases involving killing, people trafficking, and so on. They surely
demand empirical investigation in the first instance. Finally, as we have
noted elsewhere (Ellis and ter Haar 2004: 149–50), social scientists who
discuss beliefs and practices of this sort outside their proper context fail
to appreciate their seriousness in moral terms, as threats to human life
and human rights.
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ABSTRACT
In recent years, it has become common for academic writers to use ‘the occult’
as an analytical category to which are assigned various types of mystical belief
and activity that are quite widespread in Africa, including those often described
as ‘magic’ and ‘witchcraft’. It is notable that all these concepts generally go
undefined. The present article argues that much of the current academic
vocabulary used to describe and analyse the invisible world that many Africans
believe to exist is tainted by an intellectual history associated with colonialism.
Instead, we propose that much African thought and action related to the
invisible world should be considered in terms of religion, with the latter being
defined contextually as a belief in the existence of an invisible world, distinct
but not separate from the visible one, that is home to spiritual beings with
effective powers over the material world.
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RÉSUMÉ
Au cours des années récentes, il est devenu courant, pour les auteurs
académiques, d’utiliser « l’occulte » comme catégorie analytique à laquelle sont
affectés divers types de croyances et d’activités mystiques assez répandues en
Afrique, y compris celles que l’on décrit souvent comme «magiques » ou que
l’on qualifie de « sorcellerie ». Il est intéressant de noter que tous ces concepts
sont généralement non définis. Cet article soutient qu’une grande partie du
vocabulaire académique actuellement utilisé pour décrire et analyser le monde
invisible que beaucoup d’Africains croient exister est entaché d’une histoire
intellectuelle associée au colonialisme. L’article propose plutôt de considérer
une grande partie de la pensée et de l’action africaines liées au monde invisible
en termes de religion, cette dernière étant définie contextuellement comme
une croyance dans l’existence d’un monde invisible, distinct mais non séparé
du monde visible, peuplé d’êtres spirituels dotés de pouvoirs réels sur le monde
matériel.
